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I. Introduction
The determinants of inflation rate in developing countries are extremely important
for policy makers as when the causes of inflation are correctly specified the appropriate
policy change can be easily diagnosed and effectively implemented. Inflation in a small-
open economy can be influenced by both internal and external factors. Internal factors
include, among others, government deficits, debt financing, monetary policy, institutional
economics (shirking, opportunism, economic freedom, risk, etc.) and structural regime
changes (revolution, political regime changes, policy constraints, etc.). External factors
include terms of trade and foreign interest rate as well as the attitude of the rest of the
world (sanctions, risk generating activities, wars, etc.) toward the country. The objective
of this paper is to develop and test a model of inflation rate, which takes into account all
of these factors. To the best knowledge of the author, no such study for developing or
developed countries exists.
The impact of government deficits and debt financing on inflation rate can be
thought of through different channels. Higher government deficits result in higher interest
rates, which then leads to lower domestic investment. This crowding-out effect of deficits
will eventually translate into a lower formation of capital and lead to a lower aggregate
supply and a higher price. However, the impact of deficit on interest rates is still
debatable. For example, Bradley (1986) lists twenty-one studies on the deficit-interest
rate link and finds that only four provided supporting evidence for a positive and
2statistically significant impact of the deficit on interest rates. The rest of the studies finds
either no evidence of a significant impact or produces mixed results, including the
absence of any linkage. The literature on the deficit-interest rate link for a small-open
economy under capital mobility is limited to theoretical studies. Empirical studies pertain
to either large open, or closed economy models, see Evans (1985), Giannaros et al.
(1985), Tanzi (1985), Cebula (1985), Hoelscher (1986) and Bradley (1986).
The second channel in which deficits and debt financing can affect the inflation
rate is through the monetization of the deficit/debt. Monetary authority must then act to
ensure that the government’s intertemporal budget is balanced, i.e., a situation of fiscal
dominance. With fiscal dominance, an increase in government debt will eventually
require an increase in seigniorage. King and Plosser (1985) and Grier and
Neiman (1987), e.g., found mixed evidence for fiscal dominance in the United States;
however, Ashra et al. (2004) find no systematic relationship between money and fiscal
deficits in India. It is also believed that the uncertainty as to the time the deficits are
financed can influence the rate of inflation. For example, Dornbush et al. (1990) and
Drazen and Helpman (1990) find such an uncertainty creates fluctuation in the inflation
rate. 
The third channel is the wealth effect of deficits/debt financing. When deficits and
debts are financed by issuing bonds and bondholders do not consider bonds as future
taxes (a non-Ricardian view), the wealth of the nation is perceived to have gone up. A
higher wealth effect increases the demand for goods and services and drives prices up.
However, Tekin-Koru and Ozmen (2003) find no support for the linkage between the
budget deficit and inflation through the wealth effect in Turkey. Instead, they found that
3deficit financing leads to a higher growth of interest-bearing broad money, but not
currency seigniorage. Finally, institutional economics reduces information costs,
encourages capital formation and capital mobility, allows risks to be priced and shared
and facilitates cooperation. These institutions improve aggregate economic performance,
see North and Thomas (1973), North (1990), Drobak and Nye (1997), Levine (1997) and
Klein and Luu (2003). Improvements in aggregated economic performance should lead to
a lower inflation rate. 
External factors include terms of trade and foreign interest rate besides, among
others, sanctions and wars. The countries, especially developing countries, for which the
economy depends heavily on the import of capital, are subject to higher prices through
the supply effect (cost-push inflation), as the price of imported capital goods goes up. For
example, Senhadji (2003) argues that a stylized developing economy relies heavily on
imports for the capital formation and since it faces an upward-sloping supply function of
foreign loans, its debt accumulation increases with the size of debt and the cost of
servicing the debt. If an unfavorable change in the terms of trade increases the cost of the
imported capital then the formation of capital will suffer. This in turn suppresses the
aggregate supply and causes inflation. The same result can be obtained with a hike in
foreign interest rates, as such hikes make the financing of the imported capital (foreign
loans) more expensive. Finally, an unfavorable change in the terms of trade can result in
an imported inflation. Bahmani-Oskooee (1995), e.g., finds the world price has a positive
impact over the long run on the consumer price in Iran and Arize et al. (2004) find
inflation in 82 countries responds positively to the volatility of real and nominal
exchange rates. Finally, sanctions, wars, etc. clearly generate, through the supply effect, a
4higher inflation. For example, Berument and Kilinc (2004) find shocks in the industrial
production of Germany, the United States and the rest of the world will affect positively
the inflation rate in Turkey. To the best knowledge of the author there is no study so far
in the literature that investigates the impact of all the above-mentioned factors on the
inflation rate for developing or developed countries. 
The purpose of this study is to develop an empirically testable model for three
small-open economy countries, i.e., Egypt, Iran and Turkey. Egypt, with more than 90%
of the country being desert land, relies mostly on tourism; Iran, on oil exports and
Turkey, on agricultural products. The model used in this study is an augmented version of
the monetarist model which, contrary to the existing literature, is designed in such a way
to incorporate both external and internal factors, which cause inflation in the country.
Furthermore, since the model also incorporates government deficits and debt we could
test Sargent and Wallace’s (1986) views that (i) the tighter is the current monetary policy,
the higher must the inflation rate be eventually and (ii) that government deficits and debt
will be eventually monetized over the long run.
It was found that our model is successful in capturing the impact of fiscal
instruments, i.e., deficits, debt and debt management, and of monetary instruments on the
inflation rate in developing countries. Furthermore, a policy toward a stronger currency is
deflationary and most sources of inflation in the countries under study are domestic
factors. Finally, it was found Sargent and Wallace’s view on a tight monetary policy
leading to higher inflation over the long run is accepted for Egypt and Turkey. Moreover,
their view on government deficits and debt being eventually monetized over the long run
applies only to Egypt.
5The following section deals with the development of the theoretical model.
Section III describes the data and the long-run empirical methodology and results.
Section IV is devoted to the short-run dynamic models for these countries. The final
section provides some concluding remarks. The appendix fully describes the data.
II. The Model
Many studies on inflation rate for both developed and developing countries used
different versions of the monetarist approach. For example, for developed countries, see,
McGuire (1976), Meltzer (1977) and Korteweg and Meltzer (1978). For developing
countries, see, e.g., Harberger (1963), Bomberger and Makinen (1979), Sheehey (1979),
Nugent and Glezakos (1979), Saini (1982), Ize and Salas (1985), McNelis (1987), Darrat
and Arize (1990), Bahmani-Oskooee and Malixi (1992), Bahmani-Oskooee (1995) and
Ashra et al. (2004).
The monetarist approach to inflation determination is based on the quantity
equation, which relates the current rates of change of aggregate expenditure, m + v, to the
nominal value of current income, π + y, where m, v, π and y are the growth rate of
nominal money supply, velocity of money, price and real income, respectively. In this
approach, the inflation rate is related to the growth rate of money in excess of the growth
rate of income. Along a steady growth path, the fully anticipated rate of price change
remains constant. Departures from long-run equilibrium give rise to an excess demand
for, or supply of, money and goods. Another approach is based on the equilibrium in the
money market where the demand for money is derived from individual optimization and
the supply of money is exogenous. Then again, departures from long-run equilibrium
give rise to an excess demand for, or supply of, money and goods. Prices should adjust so
6that the markets will be cleared again. To avoid an ad-hoc determination the latter
approach will be followed in this paper. 
For the sake of simplicity, following Hueng (1999) among many others, we
assume that labor is supplied inelastically. Consider an economy with a single consumer,
representing a large number of identical consumers. The consumer maximizes the
following utility function:
E { )}*m t , mt k t , g t ,*c t, ct  U(
0t
β t∑
∞
=
, (1)
where ct and c*t are single, non-storable, real domestic and foreign consumption goods,
respectively. mt and m*t are the holdings of domestic real (M/p) and foreign real (M*/p*)
cash balances, respectively. E is the expectation operator, and the discount factor satisfies
0<β<1. g is the real government expenditure on goods and services and it is assumed to
be a “good”. Including government expenditure in preferences is based on the assumption
that individuals benefit from government services in their consumption, say, clean and
safe roads, foods which have been inspected, etc. provide a higher utility to consumers.
Alternatively, following the literature, we can consider g as public demand for public
goods. In fact, allowing consumer preferences to depend on government spending is not
new in the literature, see, e.g., Barro (1981), Aschaurer (1985), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993), Karras (1994), Ahmed and Yoo (1995),
Ambler and Cardia (1997), Amano and Wirjanto (1997, 1998), and Cardia, et al. (2003). 
Following Kim (2000), variable kt, which summarizes risk associated to holding
domestic money is also included. However, in contrast with Kim, we assume variable k is
7a function of anticipated variables over the long run and policy and political regime
changes over the short run. Specifically, we postulate that over the long run:
log (kt) = k0 defgdpt + k1 debtgdpt + k2 fdgdpt. (2)
Equation (2) is held subject to a short-run dynamic system, which is a function of a set of
variables included in DUM as well as all other predetermined short-run (stationary)
variables known to individuals. These variables include the growth of money supply,
changes in fiscal variables per GDP, the growth in exchange rate, domestic and foreign
inflation as well as changes in interest rates. 
The set of seasonal and interventional dummies DUM includes dummy variables
which account for wars, sanctions, political and technical changes, innovations as well as
policy regime changes which influence services of money. Note that DUM appears only
in the short-run dynamic of the system. Variables defgdp, debtgdp and fdgdp are real
government deficits per GDP, the government debt outstanding per GDP and the
government foreign-financed debt per GDP, respectively. We assume government debt
pays the same interest rate as deposits at the bank (i.e., R). In a risky environment agents
substitute real or interest-bearing assets for money.
For example, as the government deficit per GDP increases agents perceive higher
future taxes or money supply (inflation). At the same time, the higher is the outstanding
government debt relative to the size of the economy, the riskier the environment will be
perceived. Individuals may hold these bonds to bridge the gap between the future labor
income and expenditures, including tax expenditures. Consequently, we hypothesize
constant coefficients k0>0 and k1>0. Furthermore, an increase in the amount of
government debt held by foreign investors/governments may be considered a cause for
8future devaluation of the domestic currency. Consequently, demand for domestic money,
may fall, implying k2>0.
The utility function is assumed to be increasing in all its arguments, except
variable k that is decreasing, and is strictly concave and continuously differentiable. The
demand for monetary services S [= m and m*, following Sidrauski (1967)] will always be
positive if we assume lims→0 Us(c, c*, g,  k m, m*) = ∞, for all c and c*, where
Us = ∂U(c, c*, g, k m, m*)/∂s. Assume also that the U.S. dollar represents foreign
currency and that, following Stockman (1980), Lucas (1982), Guidotti (1993) and Hueng
(1999), purchases of domestic and foreign goods are made with domestic and foreign
currencies, respectively.
Given g, defgdp, debtgdp and fdgdp, the consumer maximizes (1) subject to the
following budget constraint:
τt + yt + (1 + πt)-1 mt-1 + qt (1 + π*t)-1 m*t-1 + (1 + πt)-1 (1 + Rt-1) dt-1 +
qt (1 + π*t)-1 (1 + R*t-1) d*t-1 = ct + qt ct* + mt + qt mt* + dt + qt dt*, (3)
where τt is the real value of any lump-sum transfers/taxes received/paid by consumers, qt
is the real exchange rate, defined as Et pt*/pt, Et is the nominal market (non-official/black-
market rate in some developing countries) exchange rate (domestic price of foreign
currency), pt* and pt are the foreign and domestic price levels of foreign and domestic
goods, respectively, yt is the current real endowment (income) received by the individual,
m*t-1 is the foreign real money holdings at the start of the period, dt is the one-period real
domestically financed government debt which pays R rate of return and dt* is the real
foreign issued one-period bond which pays a risk-free interest rate Rt*. Assume further
that dt and dt* are the only two storable financial assets. 
9Define Uc = ∂U(c, c*, g,  k m, m*)/∂c, Uc* = ∂U(c, c*, g,  k m, m*)/∂c*,
Um = ∂U(c, c*, g, k m, m*)/∂m, Um* = ∂U(c, c*, g, k m, m*)/∂m* and λt = the marginal
utility of wealth at time t. Maximizing the preferences with respect to m, c, m*, c*, d and
d*, and subject to budget constraint (3) for the given output and fiscal variables, will
yield the first-order conditions:
Uct + λt = 0 (4)
Uc*t + λt qt = 0 (5)
Umt + λt - βλet+1 (1 + πet+1)-1 = 0 (6)
Um*t + λt qt - βλet+1qet+1 (1 + π*et+1)-1 = 0 (7)
λt - βλet+1 (1 + Rt) (1 + πet+1)-1 = 0 (8)
λt qt - βλet+1 qet+1 (1 + R*t) (1 + π*et+1)-1 = 0. (9)
Note that xet+1 = E (xt+1│It) is the conditional expectations of xt+1, given current
information It. From (4) and (5) we can write:
Uct/Uc*t = 1/qt. (10)
Equation (10) indicates that the marginal rate of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods is equal to their relative price. Solving (5), (7) and (9) yields:
Uc*t (1 + R*t)-1 + Um*t = Uc*t. (11)
Equation (11) implies that the expected marginal benefit of adding to foreign currency
holdings at time t must equal the marginal utility from consuming foreign goods at time t.
Note that the holdings of foreign currency directly yield utility through its services (Um*t).
Furthermore, from (9) and (5) we have -Uc*t = βλet+1 qet+1 (1 + R*t) (1 + π*et+1)-1 which
implies that the expected real foreign currency invested in foreign bonds has a forgone
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value of -Uc*t. Consequently, the total marginal benefit of holding money at time t is
Uc*t + Um*t.
Similarly, from (4), (6) and (8), we have:
Uct (1 + rt)-1 + Umt = Uct. (12)
Equation (12) implies that the expected marginal benefit from adding to domestic
currency holdings at time t must equal the marginal utility of consuming domestic goods
at time t. 
To construct a parametric demand for real balances, assume the utility has an
instantaneous function as:
U(ct, ct*, gt, kt mt, mt*) = (1- α)-1 (ctα1 c*t α2 gt α3)1-α
+ ξ kt-η (1- η) -1(mt η1 m*tη2)1-η, (13)
where α1, α2, α3, α, η1, η2, η and ξ are positive parameters and 0.5<α <1, 0.5<η <1. The
latter assumption (0.5<α <1, 0.5<η <1) is needed to ensure a standard demand for money.
Since none of the following results is sensitive to the magnitude of α1, α2, α3, η1 and η2 for
the sake of simplicity we assume these parameters are all equal to one. 
A few words on the parametric function (13) are worth mentioning. This utility
is in the general class of utility functions used by Fischer (1979). However, here the
utility function includes the consumption of public and foreign goods as well as the
holding of foreign real balances. Furthermore, it allows individuals to get satisfaction
from the consumption of domestic and foreign goods as well as public goods even in the
absence of money, but with money the satisfaction will obviously increase. It seems, in
specification (13), variable kt, which summarizes risk associated with holding domestic
money also affects the holding of foreign money. This is, in fact, true since when the risk
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associated with holding domestic currency rises individuals can also substitute foreign
currency besides interest-bearing assets or other real assets. Perhaps a more accurate
specification for the second expression of (13) would be ξ (1- η) -1((mt/ kt) η1 m*tη2)1-η.
This specification was also tried and the final result, i.e., Equation (16) below, was
obtained in the exact functional form, but we needed to impose an extra restriction [i.e.,
η1<η(1- η)-1] in order to determine the sign of the coefficients theoretically. With this
extra restriction, coefficients have the same sign as Equation (16) below. The derivation
process is available upon request.
Using (10) and (13) we have:
ct* = ct qt-1. (14)
Using (11), (13) and (14) we have:
m*t = (R*t/1+ R*t)-1/η (ct 1- 2α gt1- α qtα)-1/ η ( ξ1/η kt-1 mt(1-η)/ η) (15)
Using (12), (13), (14) and (15), and assuming the domestic real consumption (ct)
is some constant proportion (ω) of the domestic real income (yt), where for simplicity we
assume ω=1, we will have:
mt 1-(1-η/ η) (1-η/ η) = (it) -1/η yt[(2α-1)/ η]+[(2α-1)(1-η)/ η η] gt[(α+1)/ η]+ (α-1)(1-η)/ η η 
(qt)-[α (1-η)/η η] – [(α-1)/η] (ξ kt-η) (1/η) + (1-η/η η) (i*)η-1/η η, or
log(mt) = m0  + m1 it + m2 log(yt) + m3 log(g t) + m4 log(k t) + m5 log(qt) 
+ m6 i*t.  (16)
Where, i*t = log(R*t/1+ R*t), it = log(Rt/1+ Rt) and, 
m0 = -1 /(1-2η) log(ξ)>0, m1 = - η/(2η-1)<0, m2 = (1-2α)/(1-2η)>0, 
m3 = (1-α)/(1-2η)< 0, m4 = - η / (2η – 1) <0, m5 = (α-η)/(1-2η)=?,
m6 = (1-η)/(1-2η)< 0.
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Equilibrium in the money market requires 
t
t
p
Ms  = 
t
t
p
Md = mt, where Mst and Mdt
are nominal money supply (M1) and money demand, respectively. This implies that 
log(pt) = log(Mst) - log(mt). (17)
Substitute log(qt) [=log(Et) + log(pt*) –log(pt)] and (2) in (16) and the resulting equation
in (17) to get:
lpt = β0 + β1 lMst + β2 it + β3 lyt + β4 lEt + β5 i*t + β6 lp*t + β7 lgt + β8 defgdpt 
+ β9 debtgdpt + β10 fdgdpt + β11 trend + ut, (18)
where an l before a variable means the logarithm of that variable and u is a disturbance
term assumed to be white noise with zero mean.  βs are the parameters to be estimated
and are defined as: 
β0 = -m0/m7, where m7 = 1 – m5 = (1 - α -η)/(1 - 2η) >0,
β1 = m7 –1>0, β2 = - m1/m7>0, β3 = - m2/m7 <0, β4 = – m5/m7=?, β5 = - m6/m7 >0,
β6 = -m5/m7=?, β7 = - m3/m7 >0, β8 = - m4/m7 k0 >0, β9 = - m4/m7 k1 >0,
β10 = - m4/m7 k2 >0. To capture technological changes we also added a linear trend to the
equation. Equation (18) is a long-run relationship between the inflation rate and its
determinants. Note that according to this model β4 = β6. However, we will not put this
restriction in our estimation so that we can distinguish between imported inflation which
is purely exogenous to the country and exchange rate which is a policy variable, but we
added the error term ut which is assumed to be white noise. 
According to the model, a higher money supply and a higher interest rate (tight
monetary policy) increase the price level over the long run. This confirms the theoretical
model of Sargent and Wallace’s (1986, p. 160) view that “[…] given the time path of
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fiscal policy and given that government interest-bearing debt can be sold only at a real
interest rate exceeding the growth rate n, the tighter is current monetary policy, the higher
must the inflation rate be eventually.” A higher real income results in a higher real
demand for money and a lower price level. We cannot determine theoretically the impact
of the exchange rate and the foreign price level on the domestic price level. A higher
government spending results in a higher price level. The impact of deficit, outstanding
government debt and debt financed externally, for a given output level, on the price level
according to our model is positive. Consequently, these fiscal variables, according to our
theoretical model are inflationary. Note that since real government expenditure is
considered a “good”, in fact, a public good, its level influences the price, while deficits
and debt are measures for future taxes and inflation and so their proportions to GDP may
influence the price level. 
III. Data, Long-Run Empirical Methodology and Results
The model is tested for three developing countries, Egypt (1975Q1-1999Q3), Iran
(1970Q1-2002Q4) and Turkey (1970Q1-2003Q3). All observations are quarterly and the
sample period for each country is chosen according to the availability of the data. The
sources of data, unless specified, are the International Financial Statistics (IFS) online.
Some of the variables were available on an annual basis and, therefore, quarterly
observations were interpolated, using the statistical process developed by RATS. This
procedure keeps the final value fixed within each full period. The appendix gives the
description and the sources of the variables. lp is the logarithm of Consumer Price Index
(CPI), lMs is the logarithm of nominal M1, i is the logarithm of (R/1+R), where R is the
discount rate at the annual rate, in decimal points, for Egypt and Turkey. For Iran,
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because of the abolition of fixed-predetermined interest rates, the domestic interest rate is
irrelevant. Note that the only reason the discount rate was chosen, as a measure for the
domestic interest rate, is because of its data availability in the sample period. Quarterly
data on other more relevant interest rates is only available for a very short part of the
sample period. For instance, Treasury Bills rates are available from 1997Q1 for Egypt
and from 1985Q4 for Turkey. 
Variable y is the real GDP, which is the nominal GDP divided by CPI. Variable g
is the real (nominal deflated by CPI) government expenditures on goods and services, E
is the nominal market exchange rate (the black market rate for part of the sample period,
see the description of dummy variables in Section IV), which is equal to the domestic
currency in terms of $US for all three countries. Foreign rate i* is the logarithm of
(R*/1+R*), where R* is the LIBOR (3-month London interbank) rate at the annual rate,
in decimal points, for all three countries. Note that in Iran the rate on foreign deposits in
the domestic banking system is LIBOR, see Kia (2003). For the sake of consistency and
comparison purposes, we also assume LIBOR as a measure for foreign interest rate for
Egypt and Turkey. Following Bahmani-Oskooee (1995), among others, the industrial
countries unit value export price index was used as a measure for the foreign price p*.
Variables defgdp, debtgdp and fdgdp are deficits, outstanding debt and foreign debt per
GDP, respectively. For Turkey, data on outstanding debt is available, but for Egypt and
Iran this variable is calculated, see data appendix.
We used Augmented Dickey-Fuller and non-parametric Phillips-Perron tests to
investigate the stationarity property of the variables. According to the test results, all
variables are integrated of degree one (non-stationary). They are, however, first-
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difference stationary. For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported, but are
available upon request.
We analyze a p-dimensional vector autoregressive model with Gaussian errors of
the form
X t = A1 X t-1+… + Ak X t-k+ µ + φ DUMt + ut, ut ~niid(0, Σ), (19)
where X t = [lpt, lMst, it, lyt, lEt, lgt, defgdpt, debtgdpt, fdgdpt], µ is p×1 constant vector
representing a linear trend in the system. 
The p-dimensional Gaussian Xt is modeled conditionally on long-run exogenous
variables i*t, lp*t and the short-run set of DUMt = (Q1t, …, Q4t, intervention dummies
and other regressors that we can consider fixed and non-stochastic), where Q’s are
centered quarterly seasonal dummy variables. Parameters A1,…, Ak, φ, and Σ are
assumed to vary without restriction. The error correction form of the model is
∆X t = Γ1 ∆X t-1+… + Γk-1 ∆X t-k+1+ ΠX t-k + µ + φ DUMt + ut, (20)
where ∆ is the first difference notation, the first k data points X t-1,…, X 0 are considered
fixed and the likelihood function is calculated for given values of these data points.
Parameters Γ1,...,Γk-1 and Π are also assumed to vary without restriction. However, the
hypotheses of interest are formulated as restriction on Π.
Note that the set of dummy variables that constitutes the set of DUM affects only
the short-run dynamic of the system. Except Q’s these dummy variables vary for each
country. They account for institutional and policy regime changes, which could affect
inflation rate in these countries, see the next section for a complete description of these
dummy variables. 
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In determining a long-run relation between the domestic price level and its
determinants, conditional on the foreign price level and the interest rate, we need to test
whether the domestic price level contributes to the cointegrating relation. If Π has a
reduced rank we want to test whether some combinations of Xt have stationary
distributions for a suitable choice of initial distribution, while others are non-stationary.
Consequently, we need to find the rank of Π, i.e., r. 
In determining the lag length one should verify if the lag length is sufficient to get
white noise residuals. As it was recommended by Hansen and Juselius (1995, p. 26), set
p=r in Equation (19) and test for autocorrelation. LM(1) and LM(4) will be employed to
confirm the choice of lag length. The order of cointegration (r) will be determined by
using Trace and λmax tests developed in Johansen and Juselius (1991). Following Cheung
and Lai (1993), both tests were adjusted in order to correct a potential bias possibly
generated by a small sample error. Tables 1 to 3 report the result of λmax and Trace tests
as well as the identified long-run relationships in space.
According to diagnostic tests reported in these tables, the lag length 4 for Egypt
and Iran and 5 for Turkey was sufficient to ensure that errors are not autocorrelated.
According to normality test results (not reported, but available upon request), the errors
are not normally distributed for Iran and Turkey data. However, as it was mentioned by
Johansen (1995a), a departure from normality is not very serious in cointegration tests,
see also, e.g., Hendry and Mizon (1998). For Egypt, (Table 1) both λmax and Trace tests
reject r≤4 at 5% level while we cannot reject r≤5, implying that r=5. As for Iran and
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Turkey, however, tables 2 and 3, both λmax and Trace test results reject r≤3 at 5% level
while we cannot reject r≤4, implying that r=4.1
Tables 1 to 3 about here 
Since we found more than one cointegrating relationship we need to identify the
estimated cointegrating vectors. Namely, in order for the estimated coefficients of
cointegrating equations to be, in fact, economically meaningful, identifying restrictions
must be imposed to ensure the uniqueness of both ß and α. Following, e.g., Johansen and
Juselius (1991) and Johansen (1995b), among many others, we can test for the existence
of possible economic hypotheses among the cointegrating vectors in the system. The
bottom panel of tables 1 to 3 reports the identified relationships for each country. As the
Chi-squared in each table indicates, restrictions are jointly accepted, the system is
identified and according to Theorem 3 of Johansen (1995b), the rank condition is
satisfied. For the sake of brevity, the rank conditions are not reported, but are available
upon request. 
Figures 1 to 3 plot the calculated values of the recursive test statistics for the
long-run identified relationships for Egypt, Iran and Turkey, respectively. Note that these
statistics are recursive likelihood-ratios normalized by the 5% critical value. Thus,
calculated statistics that exceed unity imply the rejection of the null hypothesis and
suggest unstable cointegrating vectors. The broken line curve (BETA_Z) plots the actual
disequilibrium as a function of all short-run dynamics including seasonal dummy
variables, while the solid line curve (BETA_R) plots the “clean” disequilibrium that
corrects for short-run effects. We hold up the first fifteen years for the initial estimation.
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As the figures show, all these identified equations appear stable over the long run when
the models are corrected for short-run effects. 
Figures 1 to 3 about here
Having established that the long-run equations are stable, we will analyze the
identified long-run equations in all three countries.
(A) Long-Run Price Determination
The first row of the bottom panel in tables 1 to 3 reports the identified long-run
price determination.
(i) Monetary policy: According to our theoretical model, we would expect both
the level of money supply and interest rate to have a positive influence on the price level
over the long run. Based on our estimation result for Iran and Turkey, the supply of
money has a positive impact on the price level, though it is not statistically significant for
Iran. For Egypt, however, while the money supply is not statistically significant, it
reduces the price level. To the best knowledge of the author, there is no study for Egypt,
but the result for Iran is consistent with Bahmani-Oskooee’s (1995) finding, though he
uses M2. 
Our result for Turkey confirms Baydur and Süslü’s (2004) finding, i.e., the tight
monetary policy in Turkey over the period 1989 to 1995 resulted in a rise in the general
price level because of an outflow of foreign resources. However, their analysis is mostly
a short-term study, while our finding (Table 3) is a long-run conclusion. The impact of
the level of interest rate on the price level is positive and consistent with our model.
However, the estimated coefficient for Egypt is not statistically significant. Note that the
                                                                                                                                                
1 Since unrestricted cointegrated equations, when r is more than one, are meaningless they were not
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impact of the domestic interest rate on the price level, due to the abolishment of interest
rates, is not relevant for Iran in our sample period. Consequently, Sargent and Wallace’s
view that “[…] the tighter is current monetary policy, the higher must the inflation rate be
eventually” cannot be rejected at least for Turkey among these three countries.
Considering the exchange rate as a monetary instrument, a depreciation of the
domestic currency in all these countries leads to an increase in the price level. The
positive impact of the exchange rate on the price level confirms the finding of Bahmani-
Oskooee (1995). So far, we found the domestic monetary policy, including the exchange
rate policy, has been a major contributor to inflation over the long run in these countries,
especially in Turkey. Note that according to our model, the coefficients of the exchange
rate and of the foreign price should be the same. However, when we imposed this
restriction, either the rank condition was violated (case of Turkey and Iran) or the joint
restriction was not accepted. Consequently, we left these coefficients unrestricted.
(ii) Fiscal policy: The long-run estimated coefficient of the log of real government
expenditures is positive, as our model predicts, and statistically significant for Egypt and
Iran. However, this coefficient is statistically insignificant for Turkey. To the best
knowledge of the author, no study has dealt with the impact of the government
expenditures on the price level for these countries and so comparison is not possible.
The long-run estimated coefficient of deficits per GDP for Egypt is negative, but
is statistically insignificant. This coefficient is estimated to be positive for Iran and
Turkey, and statistically significant. This result confirms our theoretical model. The result
on Turkey is consistent with the finding of Tekin-Koru and Ozmen (2003). The estimated
                                                                                                                                                
reported but are available upon request.
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coefficient of government debt per GDP is statistically significant for all three countries,
but it has a positive sign only for Egypt, confirming our theoretical model. This implies
that a higher government debt in Egypt is associated with a riskier environment while in
Turkey and Iran the opposite is true [see Equation (2)]. The estimated coefficient of
externally financed government debt per GDP is not statistically significant for any of
these countries over the long run. However, as we will see later in this paper the situation
is different over the short run. So far, we found both monetary and fiscal policies have an
effective impact on inflation rate in Egypt, Iran and Turkey. More interestingly, our
finding indicates that, in Turkey, not only the money supply, but also the level of interest
rate, when government debt and deficits exist, cause inflation over the long run.
(iii) External factors: Foreign interest rate, contrary to what our theoretical model
predicts, has a negative impact on the price level in these countries. However, the
estimated coefficient is not statistically significant for Turkey. One possible explanation
for this result is that as foreign interest rate increases demand for foreign deposits/bonds
will go up and the demand for goods and services, therefore, will fall with a depressing
impact on price. The estimated long-run coefficient of foreign price is statistically
significant for Egypt and Turkey and is positive for Egypt and Iran (i.e., imported
inflation exists for these countries), but it is negative for Turkey. The negative impact of
the foreign price on the domestic inflation rate in Turkey could be the result of the impact
of the foreign price on the aggregate supply over the long run. This is due to the fact that
the foreign price, according to our estimated long-run aggregate demand equation (third
identified equation in the bottom panel of Table 3), has a positive impact on the demand
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price in Turkey. Our result for Iran confirms Bahmani-Oskooee’s (1995) finding that
imported inflation is a source of inflation in Iran. 
In general, so far we found domestic factors, controlled by monetary and fiscal
authorities, can be very effective in curbing inflation in developing countries, at least for
Egypt, Iran and Turkey. Finally, the impact of real GDP as expected theoretically is
negative and statistically significant for all three countries. This result confirms the
findings of Bahmani-Oskooee (1995) for Iran and Neyapti (2004) for Turkey. 
(B) A Long-Run Demand for Money
The second row of the bottom panel in tables 1 to 3 reports a long-run demand for
money. Restricting the log of the price level to one might result in an estimate of a
long-run demand for real balances among our cointegrating relationships. Note that
according to our model the demand for real balances should be a function of the real
exchange rate. Here in the cointegration system we have nominal exchange rate and
foreign price. Consequently, this restricted equation is not equivalent to the long-run
demand for real balances of Equation (16). For the sake of identification, we are
restricted to this equation.
The estimated coefficient of the domestic interest rate, not relevant for Iran, has a
correct sign for Turkey (see Table 3) and is statistically significant. However, for Egypt,
it is not statistically significant and has a wrong sign. This is also true for the scale
variable (log of real income) for Egypt. The scale variable for Iran and Turkey has a
correct sign, but is statistically significant only for Iran. The coefficient of the nominal
exchange rate and the foreign price is statistically significant for all three countries, but
has a positive sign for Iran and a negative sign for Egypt and Turkey. Note that we could
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not determine the sign of the real exchange rate in Equation (16). Furthermore, the
estimated identifying equation reported in tables 1 to 3, as explained above, is not an
exact estimate of Equation (16). 
The estimated coefficient of foreign interest rate is statistically significant for all
three countries, but has a wrong sign for Turkey and Egypt implying that as the foreign
rate goes up agents substitute domestic money for foreign money in their portfolios. The
estimated coefficient of the real government expenditures has a correct sign and is
statistically significant for Iran and Turkey, but it has a wrong sign for Egypt and is not
statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of deficits per GDP and debt financed
externally per GDP is not statistically significant for any of these countries. The
estimated coefficient of debt per GDP while not statistically significant for Egypt, is
statistically significant for both Iran and Turkey. But this coefficient is positive for Iran
and negative for Turkey. This result implies that for two different economic systems, a
traditional one in Turkey and a non traditional one in Iran, the government debt is
perceived differently in demanding money if we can really consider this long-run
restricted equation a demand-for-money relationship. 
(C) Long-Run Aggregate Demand and Supply
The third identified equation for Egypt and Iran, third row of the bottom panel of
tables 1 and 2, resembles an aggregate supply relationship. To obtain an identified
system, we needed to restrict the government expenditures and the foreign financed debt
for Egypt and Iran, respectively. For Egypt, a higher exchange rate (a lower value for
domestic currency) and an increase in the foreign price (imported inflation) and in the
domestic interest rate result in an upward shift in the aggregate supply over the long run.
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Since the estimated coefficient of the real government expenditures in Iran is negative
and is statistically significant, we can conclude that as government expenditures increase,
the aggregate supply will shift to the right. Consequently, an increase in real government
expenditures in Iran will raise the output over the long run. As for external factors, the
estimated coefficient of foreign interest rate is negative and statistically significant for
both Egypt and Iran implying that a higher foreign interest rate leads to higher economic
activities in these countries. This may be due to the fact that as foreign interest rates go
up foreign financing becomes more expensive and investors/governments rely more on
domestic resources. Note that the coefficient of foreign financed debt is statistically
significant and positive (a depressing effect) for Egypt.
We also checked Sargent and Wallace’s (1996) view that government deficits and
debt will be eventually monetized over the long run. However, with this hypothesis, we
could get an identified system only for Egypt. As the fourth identified equation, Table 1,
bottom panel, fourth row shows, the hypothesis is accepted as all fiscal variables have
positive and statistically significant estimated coefficients. We also checked this
hypothesis as an independent long-run relationship for Iran and Turkey. For both
countries (for Iran, χ2 (2) =16.28, p-value=0.00 and for Turkey, χ2 (3)=17.27,
p-value=0.00) the hypothesis was rejected. Consequently, Sargent and Wallace’s view
that government deficits and debt will be eventually monetized over the long run applies
only to Egypt. 
The final identified equation for Egypt (Table 1) and the third identified equation
for Turkey (Table 3) may resemble an aggregate demand relationship. The coefficient of
both money supply and interest rate is statistically significant in both countries.
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Interestingly, while an expansionary monetary policy depresses the aggregate demand in
Egypt it stimulates the aggregate demand in Turkey, everything else being equal.
However, the estimated coefficient of domestic interest rate is positive for both countries
implying that a higher domestic interest rate results in an upward shift in aggregated
demand in both countries over the long run. Consequently, Sargent and Wallace’s view
that “[…] the tighter is current monetary policy, the higher must the inflation rate be
eventually” cannot be rejected again for Egypt and Turkey. The estimated coefficient of
the nominal exchange rate is statistically significant in both countries, but it is negative
for Egypt and positive for Turkey. This implies that a devaluation of currency in Egypt
does not improve the balance of trade while it does in Turkey, indicating, perhaps, the
Marshall-Lerner condition may not be satisfied in Egypt. The estimated coefficient of the
foreign interest rate is negative and is statistically significant for both countries indicating
that as the cost of external borrowing increases aggregate demand falls in these countries
over the long run.
The estimated coefficient of the foreign price is statistically significant in both
countries and as one would expect theoretically, the aggregate demand shifts to the right
in Turkey, but the reverse is true for Egypt. Considering the estimated aggregate supply
equation above for Egypt, it seems the imported inflation (the impact of the foreign price)
in Egypt influences the domestic price level through the aggregate supply rather than
through the aggregate demand. The estimated coefficient of the real government
expenditures is statistically significant in both countries, but the increase in government
expenditures is expansionary in Turkey, as one would expect, but has a depressing effect
in Egypt. For the sake of identification, we needed to allow the government deficits and
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outstanding debt to influence the aggregate demand in Egypt. While the estimated
coefficient of government deficits was found to be statistically insignificant, the
estimated coefficient of the outstanding debt is statistically significant and is negative. As
it was found earlier in this paper, a higher government debt in Egypt is associated with a
riskier environment and so agents will increase their demand for interest-bearing assets as
the outstanding debt increases and, everything else being the same, the demand for goods
and services will fall.
(D) Long-Run Exchange Rate Relationship
The last identified equation for Iran (Table 2) and Turkey (Table 3) may resemble
an exchange rate determination in these countries. Note that variable E is the
market-determined exchange rate. The estimated coefficient of the domestic price level,
as one would expect theoretically, is positive and statistically significant for both
countries. The estimated coefficient of the domestic interest rate, not relevant for Iran, is
statistically significant for Turkey and has a positive sign, indicating that a higher interest
rate over the long run causes a depreciation of the domestic currency. One possible
explanation is that perhaps the financial capital is not as mobile as to help the inflow of
capital to cause the value of currency to go up as the interest rate increases.
The estimated coefficient of the level of the real income is statistically significant
in both countries, but has a negative sign for Iran and a positive sign for Turkey. This
implies that as the income in Turkey goes up the demand for imports, and so the demand
for U.S. dollars, goes up, and causes the currency to depreciate, but this is not necessarily
true for Iran for which crude oil is the major export. In Iran, a higher income could be due
to a higher oil price which by itself would help to appreciate the value of the domestic
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currency in terms of the U.S. dollars, noting that U.S. is a net importer of crude oil and so
the value of its currency falls as oil price rises. This result is consistent with Bahmani-
Oskooee’s (1996) finding if we normalize Case 2 of his Table 1 on market exchange rate.
The estimated coefficients of foreign price and interest rate are statistically
significant for both countries. As one would expect theoretically, the estimated
coefficient of foreign interest rate is positive and the estimated coefficient of foreign
price is negative for both countries. Finally, the estimated coefficient of debt financed
externally is statistically significant for both countries. However, it seems as the level of
the foreign-financed debt in Iran increases its currency appreciates over the long run, but
the reverse is true for Turkey.
IV. Short-Run Dynamic Models of Inflation Rate
Having established in the previous section that long-run and identified
relationships to describe the price level and its determinants for each country exist, we
need to specify the ECM (error correction model) that is implied by our cointegrating
vectors. Following Granger (1986), we should note that if small equilibrium errors can be
ignored, while reacting substantially to large ones, the error correcting equation is non
linear. All possible kinds of non linear specifications, i.e., squared, cubed and fourth
powered of the equilibrium errors (with statistically significant coefficients) as well as the
products of those significant equilibrium errors were included. 
In estimating ECMs, several concerns are important. First, to avoid biased results,
we allow for a lag profile of four quarters. Second, having too many coefficients can also
lead to inefficient estimates. To guard against this problem and ensure parsimonious
estimations, we select the final ECMs on the basis of Hendry’s General-to-Specific
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approach. Tables (4) to (6) assemble the results from estimating ECMs for Egypt, Iran
and Turkey, respectively.
In these tables, White is White’s (1980) general test for heteroskedasticity, ARCH
is five-order Engle’s (1982) test, Godfrey is five-order Godfrey’s (1978) test, REST is
Ramsey’s (1969) misspecification test, Normality is Jarque-Bera’s (1987) normality
statistic, Li is Hansen’s (1992) stability test for the null hypothesis that the estimated
ith coefficient or variance of the error term is constant and Lc is Hansen’s (1992) stability
test for the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients as well as the error variance are
jointly constant. None of these diagnostic checks is significant. According to Hansen’s
stability test result, all of the coefficients, individually or jointly, are stable. Both level
and interactive combinations of the dummy variables included in the set DUM were tried
for the impact of these potential shift events in the models. As it was mentioned in the
previous section, DUM also appeared in the short-run dynamic of the system in our
cointegration regression.
Tables 4 to 6 about here
(A) Short-Run Dynamic of Inflation Rate in Egypt
For the dummy variables included in the set of DUM which account for
regime/institutional changes, we consider six major changes that have characterized
Egypt during our sample period (see The Middle East and North Africa, 2004). (i) On
March 26, 1979, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel under U.S. auspices. Dummy
variable peace = 1 since 1979Q2, and = 0, otherwise, accounts for this political change.
(ii) In February 1991, new market related currency exchange arrangements as a prelude
to a single unified rate, with full convertibility no later than February 1992, were
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introduced. The arrangements allowed for the determination, by the commercial banks, of
a free-market rate of exchange, although an ‘official’ Central Bank rate continued to be
set at not more than 5% less than the commercial bank rate. This two-tier system resulted
in an effective devaluation of nearly 40% compared with the official rate in the previous
year. Dummy variable flex = 1 since 1991Q1, and = 0, otherwise, was developed to
account for this policy regime change.
(iii) A new sales tax of between 5% and 30% was introduced on most goods and
services in May 1991. Dummy variable price = 1 for 1991Q2, and = 0 otherwise,
accounts for a jump in price for this fiscal policy change. (iv) In late 1994, price subsidies
were eliminated or substantially reduced throughout the public sector, and schedules
existed for the removal of the remaining subsidies. This fiscal policy resulted in a hike in
price level in late 1994 and early 1995. Dummy variable pricesub = 1 for the period
1994Q4 and 1995Q1, and = 0 otherwise, accounts for this policy change.
(v) In July 1993, the government’s declared aim was to reduce Egypt's maximum
import tariff from 80% (to which the maximum tariff had been cut from 100% earlier in
1993) to 50% over a four-year period. In February 1994, the maximum import tariff
actually lowered from 80% to 70%. In January 1996, as part of its drive to stimulate
industrial investment, the government cut import tariffs on capital goods from 20%-40%
to 10%, and thirteen free-trade zones were approved. To account for this policy regime
change, dummy variable tariff was constructed. It is zero up to 1993Q1 and is equal to
0.25 in 1993Q2, increases linearly to 1 in 1996Q1 and remains 1 for the rest of the
period. (vi) In mid-1998, Egypt was admitted to the Common Market for Eastern and
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Southern Africa (COMESA). Dummy variable common = 1 since 1998Q2 and = 0
otherwise, was constructed to account for this event.
According to our estimation results reported in Table 4, the error-correction term
is significant for only the error term generated from the first identified equation, see
Table 1. None of the other equilibrium errors was found to be statistically significant.
Interestingly, the error term is non linear implying that individuals in Egypt may ignore a
small deviation from equilibrium, but react drastically to a large deviation. According to
a positive estimated coefficient of money supply growth, this variable is a determinant of
the inflation rate in Egypt over the short run. The change in interest rate has a negative
estimated coefficient implying that a tight monetary policy reduces the inflation rate over
the short run. Since the estimated coefficient of real GDP is positive, as the growth of real
GDP increases the inflation rate in Egypt increases. The growth in the depreciation of the
domestic currency (the growth of exchange rate) results in a higher inflation rate in
Egypt, as the estimated coefficient of this variable is positive. Since the estimated
coefficient of the foreign inflation rate is positive, the imported inflation rate is also a
major cause of the inflation rate in Egypt over the short run as it is over the long run, see
Table 1. 
As the estimated coefficient of the change in deficits per GDP indicates, this
variable affects negatively the inflation rate after a quarter, and after three quarters it will
raise the inflation rate, but again after a year, it causes the inflation rate to fall. The
overall coefficient (the sum of these coefficients) is negative. This finding confirms our
long-run result, even though the long-run coefficient was found to be statistically
insignificant (Table 1). As the estimated coefficient of the debt per GDP indicates, this
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fiscal policy variable causes the inflation rate to go up after three quarters, but after a year
it has a depressing effect on the inflation rate with an overall negative impact on the
inflation rate over the short run. However, as we found earlier over the long run
(Table 1), this fiscal variable has a positive impact on the inflation rate over the long run.
As for institutional and other changes, the introduction of a single market
determined exchange rate, finalized in February 1992, helped to reduce the inflation rate
because the growth of real government expenditures was found, since then, to lower
inflation rate. This is due to the negative estimated coefficient of the real growth in
government expenditures after the introduction of this policy, see the coefficient of
(∆lg) (flex) in Table 4. Furthermore, since the intercept flex is also negative we can
conclude that the inflation rate fell in general when this policy went into effect. However,
the introduction of a new sales tax in May 1991 as well as the elimination of price
subsidies in late 1994 resulted in an increase in the inflation rate, as the estimated
coefficient of these dummy variables is positive. Finally, the estimated coefficient of
foreign financing after the peace agreement with Israel is negative implying that the
treaty helped the foreign financing of debt to have a negative impact on inflation. None of
the other policy regime and institutional changes has any impact on the inflation rate in
Egypt. The overall conclusion is that the sources of inflation in Egypt are mostly internal
and include both fiscal and monetary policies.
(B) Short-Run Dynamic of Inflation Rate in Iran
For the dummy variables included in the set of DUM which account for
regime/institutional changes, we consider seven major policy regime changes that have
characterized Iran [see various publications of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic
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of Iran, including Economic Trends, and Kia, (2003)]: (i) The revolution of April 1979.
(ii) The first formal U.S. sanctions against Iran ordered by President Carter in April 1980,
following the break in diplomatic relations between the two countries. (iii) The
Islamization of the banking system that began in March 1984. (iv) The Iraq-Iran war over
the period 1980-1988. (v) The unification of official and market-determined foreign
exchange rates since late March 1993. (vi) The introduction of inflation targeting by the
Central Bank over the period March 1995 through March 1998, and (vii) the introduction
of the first privately owned financial institution in September 1997. Accordingly, we use
the following dummy variables to represent these potential policy regime shifts and
exogenous shocks: Rev = 1 from 1979Q2- 2001Q4, and = 0, otherwise, san = 1 since
1980Q2 and = 0, otherwise, Zero = 1 from 1984Q1- 2001Q4, and = 0, otherwise, War = 1
from 1980Q4-1988Q3, and = 0, otherwise, Ue = 1 from 1993Q1, and = 0, otherwise,
Inflation = 1 from 1995Q2-1998Q1, and = 0, otherwise, and Private = 1 from 1997Q3-
2001Q4, and = 0, otherwise.
According to our estimation results reported in Table 5, the error-correction term
is significant for only the error term generated from the first identified equation, see
Table 2. None of the other equilibrium errors was found to be statistically significant.
Furthermore, as the growth of real GDP increases the inflation rate increases. The growth
of money supply does not have any impact on the inflation rate in Iran over the short-run
as none of the estimated coefficients of this variable was found to be statistically
significant. The only external factor effect on the inflation rate over the short run is the
foreign interest rate since, according to the estimated positive coefficient of the foreign
interest rate, as it increases the inflation rate will increase in Iran. Over the long run,
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however, we found (Table 2) the foreign interest rate has a depressing impact on the price
level in Iran. 
As for the fiscal variables, the estimated coefficient of the growth of real
government expenditures is statistically significant only during the increase in oil price in
late 1973 and early 1974, implying that it caused the inflation rate to increase.
Furthermore, the impact of the oil price increase in that period, as the estimated
coefficient of dummy variable oil indicates, is an upward pressure on the inflation rate.
The change in the deficits per GDP affects negatively, similar to Egypt, the inflation rate
after a quarter. Furthermore, as the estimated coefficient of this variable after the
imposition of sanctions indicates, the change in the government deficit per GDP resulted
in a further reduction in the inflation rate. According to the estimated coefficient of the
debt financed externally per GDP, as this variable increases, and as our theoretical model
indicates, the demand for real balances falls and the inflation rate increases but, after a
second quarter, the inflation rate falls with an overall coefficient (the sum of two
coefficients) estimated to be positive. The impact of the externally financed debt after the
imposition of sanctions is an upward pressure on the inflation rate.
As for institutional and other changes, the estimated coefficient of lagged inflation
rate after the revolution is positive after one and three quarters indicating that the
revolution resulted in a higher inflation rate in Iran. No other institutional or other change
was found to have any impact on the inflation rate. During the third and fourth quarters of
the year (second and third Iranian quarters), the inflation rate was found to be lower in
Iran as the estimated coefficient of seasonal dummy variable Q3 and Q4 is negative.
Dummy variables Nor 1973Q1, Nor 1977Q2 and Nor 1978Q4 reflect mostly oil price
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shocks. The estimated coefficients of these dummy variables are all positive, indicating
the oil price shocks created a higher inflation rate in Iran.
To conclude, the sources of inflation in Iran are both external and internal factors.
The foreign interest rate and sanctions are external factors. Fiscal policy, as an internal
factor, could be the most effective tool over the short run to fight inflation in Iran. The
government debt financed externally, while reducing the price level over the long run,
creates more uncertainty over the short run and causes the inflation rate to increase. 
(C) Short-Run Dynamic of Inflation Rate in Turkey
For the dummy variables included in the set of DUM which account for
regime/institutional changes, we consider five major policy regime changes that have
characterized Turkey (see The Middle East and North Africa, 2004): (i) In 1984Q4 the
government introduced a value-added tax to replace the previous unwieldy system of
production taxes. (ii) Two U.S. credit rating agencies downgraded Turkey's credit rating,
which resulted in a run of foreign currencies. The value of the lira was officially devalued
by 12% against the US dollar; however, the currency continued to plummet. Interest rates
rose to 150% - 200% as the government and the Central Bank desperately tried to bring
the financial markets under control. In April 1994, the government announced a program
of austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit, lower inflation and restore domestic
and international confidence in the economy. The program included a freezing of wages,
price increases of up to 100% on state monopoly goods, as well as longer-term
restructuring measures such as the closure of loss-making state enterprises and an
accelerated privatization process.
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(iii) In July 1995, the new government approved a raise in the minimum wage and
salary increases of 50% for state workers and pensioners. The government stated that the
main aspects of its economic program were: a commitment to a free-market economy,
lower inflation and a steady growth rate, lower taxation for producers, greater efforts to
attract foreign investment, an acceleration in the privatization program and an emphasis
on investment in infrastructure projects. (iv) In January 2000, as part of the anti-inflation
program, a new exchange rate substitution policy took effect under which the managed
peg used since 1994 was abandoned in favor of a peg set according to a pre-determined
devaluation rate (20% in 2000), itself set against a basket of the US dollar and the euro.
(v) In February 2001, following a public clash between the President and the
Prime Minister, the financial system went into near-meltdown in Turkey's worst
economic crisis in recent years. A massive flight of capital forced the government to float
the lira and accept an immediate devaluation of the currency. Consequential consumer
price increases sparked widespread protest demonstrations, amidst rumors that another
military takeover was imminent. The interest rate rose to the equivalent of 4,000%
annually. On February 22, the government ended the crawling peg with the US dollar and
allowed the lira to float freely, with the result that its value fell by 36% over two days.
Accordingly, we use the following dummy variables to represent these potential policy
regime shifts and exogenous shocks: vtax = 1 from 1984Q4 and = 0, otherwise,
fcrisis = 1 for 1994Q2 and = 0, otherwise, pwd = 1 for 1995Q2-1995Q3 and = 0,
otherwise, MEX = 1 for 1994Q4-1999Q4 and = 0, otherwise, PEX = 1 for 2000Q1-
2000Q4 and = 0, otherwise, flex = 1 since 2001Q1 and = 0, otherwise.
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According to our estimation results reported in Table 6, the error-correction term
is significant for only the error term generated from the first identified equation (the
overall price level) and the third identified equation (aggregate demand), see Table 3.
None of the other equilibrium errors was found to be statistically significant.
Interestingly, the error term from the long-run overall price is non linear implying that
individuals in Turkey may ignore a small deviation from equilibrium, but react drastically
to a large deviation. However, the coefficient of both the linear and non-linear error terms
is positive, indicating that a deviation from the equilibrium price over the long term may
cause further deviation from equilibrium. The error term generated from the aggregate
demand relationship, however, brings the system back to equilibrium.
As for the monetary policy effect, according to the estimation result reported in
Table 6, the money supply growth is a determinant of the inflation rate in Turkey over the
short run, but only after the introduction of the value-added tax in 1984. The estimated
coefficient of the change in interest rate is negative after three quarters and is positive
after four quarters. Namely, a higher interest rate (a tight monetary policy) reduces the
inflation rate after three quarters, but will cause it to go up after four quarters. The
coefficient of the growth of exchange rate is negative, implying that a depreciation in the
value of domestic currency reduces the inflation rate. None of the fiscal policy variables
was found to have any impact on the short-run dynamic. Consequently, it seems the
inflation in Turkey is a monetary phenomenon over the short run.
The estimated coefficient of the real growth of GDP is positive after a quarter and
negative after two quarters with an overall positive effect. Consequently, as the growth of
real GDP increases, the inflation rate in Turkey increases first and then falls. However,
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during the managed exchange rate period of 1994-1999 and the current flexible exchange
rate period (since 2001), the real growth of GDP resulted in a higher inflation rate in
Turkey, as the coefficient of the growth rate became steeper, after two quarters and four
quarters, respectively, in these periods. No other policy regime or institutional change
was found to influence the inflation rate in Turkey. The financial crisis of 1994 had a
positive shock on the inflation rate.
As for external factors, the imported inflation has a negative impact on the
inflation rate. The coefficient of the foreign inflation rate is negative after two quarters.
This result is similar to our long-run estimation result. In general, the inflation rate is
higher during the last quarter of the year as the positive estimated coefficient of our
seasonal dummy indicates. Dummy variable Nor 1980Q1, which accounts for the outlier
in the data, has a positive estimated coefficient. To the best knowledge of the author, no
event reflects this outlier.
The overall conclusion is that the sources of inflation in Turkey are all internal
factors. They arise mostly from the monetary policy, including the exchange rate policy.
The effect of external factors is actually deflationary both over the short and the long run. 
V. Conclusions
This paper focuses on internal and external factors, which influence the inflation
rate in developing countries. A monetary model of inflation rate, capable of incorporating
both monetary and fiscal policies as well as other internal and external factors, was
developed and tested on three developing countries: Egypt, Iran and Turkey. These
countries have different economic structures. Egypt, with more than 90% of the country
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being desert land, relies mostly on tourism; Iran, on oil exports and Turkey, on
agricultural products. The model tested on the data of these countries and the estimation
results proved the validity of the model as it is unique in this literature. Therefore, the
first contribution of this paper is the development of the model. It should, however, be
mentioned that since these countries have different economic structures and cultures
some of the coefficients have different signs.
For instance, we found over the long run, a higher exchange rate (lower value of
domestic currency) leads to a higher price in all these countries. So a policy regime that
leads to a stronger currency can help to lower inflation in all three countries. However, a
higher money supply can only lead to a higher price level in Turkey over the long run,
but it has no significant impact in Egypt or Iran. This is also true for the domestic interest
rate. Consequently, the reduction in the growth of the money supply is a very important
tool in fighting inflation in Turkey, but not the other two countries. 
It is also found that the fiscal policy is very effective in Egypt and Iran to fight
inflation as the increase in the real government expenditures cause inflation in these
countries, but no apparent impact in Turkey. Furthermore, government deficits in Iran
and Turkey are inflationary over the long run, but not in Egypt. More interestingly, it was
found, for the debt management policy, that, while a higher outstanding government debt
in Egypt is considered by economic agents as a higher risky environment (i.e., demand
for real balances falls), it is considered a higher asset in Iran and Turkey (i.e., demand for
real balances increases) over the long run. Therefore, a high debt per GDP in Egypt is
inflationary, but is deflationary in Iran and Turkey. As for the foreign financing of the
government debt, we found no price impact in any of these countries over the long run. In
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general, we found the major factors affecting inflation in developing countries, at least
for Egypt, Iran and Turkey over the long run, are internal rather than external factors. For
example, the foreign interest rate has a deflationary effect in these countries over the long
run. Imported inflation exists only for Egypt.
Moreover, we found that over the short run the money supply growth and the
interest rate as well as the exchange rate policy can effectively influence the inflation rate
in Egypt. Fiscal variables like deficits per GDP and debt per GDP negatively affect the
inflation rate in Egypt. As for the external factors, imported inflation is also a major
cause of inflation in Egypt over the short run.
We found that the introduction of a single market determined exchange rate,
finalized in February 1992, among institutional and policy regime changes which affect
the short-run dynamic of the system, helped to reduce the inflation rate in Egypt.
However, the introduction of a new sales tax in May 1991 as well as the elimination of
price subsidies in late 1994 resulted in an increase of the inflation rate in Egypt. Finally,
the peace treaty with Israel helped the foreign financing of debt in having a negative
impact on inflation. 
The overall conclusion over the short run for Iran is that the sources of inflation
are both external and internal factors. The external factors include the foreign interest rate
and sanctions. The fiscal policy as an internal factor has been the most effective tool over
the short run to fight inflation in Iran. The government debt financed externally, while
reducing the price level over the long run, creates more uncertainty over the short run and
causes the inflation rate to increase.
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The money supply growth is a determinant of the inflation rate in Turkey over the
short run, but only after the introduction of a value-added tax in 1984. An increase in the
interest rate while over the long run leads to a higher price level will reduce the inflation
rate over the short run in Turkey. None of the fiscal policy variables was found to have
any impact on the short run dynamic of the inflation rate. Consequently, it seems the
inflation in Turkey is a monetary phenomenon even over the short run. The policy regime
changes over the managed exchange rate period of 1994-1999 had an upward pressure on
the short-run dynamic of inflation in Turkey similar to the current flexible exchange rate
period (since 2001). Another domestic shock to inflation was found to be the financial
crisis of 1994. The overall conclusion is that the sources of inflation in Turkey are all
internal factors. They arise mostly from the monetary policy, including the exchange rate
policy. The world effect is actually deflationary both over the short and the long run.
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Data Appendix
The data are not seasonally adjusted and are from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) online, compiled by IMF. Data on outstanding debt (Debt) for Egypt and
Iran were not available and therefore were constructed according to the following
formulas:
Debtt = Debtt-1[1 + R t-1(=interest rate on debt)] + gct (=government spending on goods
and services and transfer payments) - Tt(=government tax revenues) - ∆MBt (=change in
monetary base)
= Debtt-1 + deficitst (=R t-1 Debtt-1 + gct - Tt) - ∆MBt. 
It was assumed that Debt0 (debt at the first observation) is zero. Some missing
data for all three countries were taken from the Word Development Indicator (WDI).
Some missing observations for Turkey were also taken from the State Institute of
Statistics of Turkey (SIS) or IMF – Economic and Financial Data for Turkey. When
some observations within a series were missing they were interpolated. Data series on
GDP, government deficits and expenditures as well as debt financed externally and
outstanding government debt (for Turkey) are only available yearly. Quarterly
observations were, consequently, interpolated using the statistical process developed by
RATS. This procedure keeps the final value fixed within each full period.
Information on institutional and policy changes in Egypt and Turkey were taken
from The Middle East and North Africa (2004) and for Iran, from various Central Bank
publications, including Economic Trends, as well as from Kia (2003).
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Figure 1: Recursive Likelihood Ratio Tests for Egypt
Figure 2: Recursive Likelihood Ratio Tests for Iran
Figure 3: Recursive Likelihood Ratio Tests for Turkey
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Table 1* Long-Run Test Results for Egypt
Tests of the Cointegration Rank
H0=r 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Diagnostic tests**
p-value
λmax(1) 94.75 75.43 61.23 46.46 42.31 26.67a 11.26 7.71 1.04 LM(1)             0.26
λmax 95(2) 61.29 55.50 49.42 43.97 37.52 31.46 25.54 18.96 12.25 LM(4)             0.77
Trace(1) 366.90 272.14 196.70 135.46 89.00 46.69a 20.01 8.75 1.04
Trace 95(3) 221.56 182.45 146.75 114.96 86.96 62.61 42.20 25.47 12.39
Lag length = 4
Identified Long-Run Relationships for r=5. Null: Restrictions are accepted: χ2 (2) = 3.38, p-value = 0.18
Normalized lMs lp i ly lE i* lp* lg defgdp debtgdp fdgdp trend
lp
(St. Error)
-0.74
(0.75)
- 3.40
(3.22)
-12.26
(4.31)
7.87
(1.32)
-6.19
(0.70)
7.67
(2.28)
25.94
(2.95)
-2.45
(6.72)
2.74
(1.20)
0.50
(31.17) Restrict
ed = 0
lMs
(St. Error)
-
Restrict
ed = 1
0.02
(0.15)
-0.34
(0.20)
-0.26
(0.06)
0.38
(0.04)
-0.64
(0.11)
0.19
(0.12)
-0.15
(0.30)
0.01
(0.05)
0.19
(1.58)
0.01
(0.002)
lp
(St. Error) Restrict
ed = 0
- 3.32
(0.65)
4.42
(0.75)
0.58
(0.24)
-1.34
(0.17)
2.36
(0.53) Restrict
ed = 0
Restrict
ed = 0
Restricted
= 0
21.95
(6.25)
0.01
(0.01)
lMs
(St. Error)
-
Restrict
ed = 0
Restrict
ed = 0
Restrict
ed = 0
Restrict
ed = 0
Restrict
ed = 0
Restrict
ed = 0
0.50
(0.09)
6.24
(0.48)
0.13
(0.06)
2.67
(1.26)
0.03
(0.001)
lp
(St. Error)
- 0.55
(0.13)
- 2.25
(0.29)
-0.70
(0.22)
-0. 23
(0.08)
-0.08
(0.04)
-0.38
(0.13)
- 0.45
(0.20)
0.03
(0.49)
-0.53
(0.08) Restrict
ed = 0
0.06
(0.01)
a = means accept the null of r=5.
(1) Both λmax and Trace tests have been multiplied by the small sample correction factor (N – kp)/N, see
Cheung and Lai (1993). 
(2) The source is Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 2, p. 469.
(3) The source is Johansen (1995a), Table 15.4, p. 216.
* The sample period is 1975Q1-1999Q3. The model includes constant, trend and seasonal dummies. lMs is
the log of nominal money supply, i and i* are the log[R/(1+R)]and log[R*/(1+R*)], respectively, where R
and R* are domestic and foreign interest rates in decimal points, respectively, ly is the log of real GDP, lE
is the log of nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per $US), lp and lp* are the log of domestic CPI
and an index of industrial countries exports unit values, respectively. lg is the log of real government
expenditures on goods and services, defgdp and debtgdp are deficits and outstanding debt per GDP,
respectively. fdgdp is the amount of foreign financed debt per GDP and trend is a linear time trend. 
** LM(1) and LM(4) are one and four-order Lagrangian Multiplier test for autocorrelation, respectively
[Godfrey (1988)].
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Table 2* Long-Run Test Results for Iran
Tests of the Cointegration Rank
H0=r 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Diagnostic tests**
p-value
λmax(1) 99.33 71.42 65.05 43.62 31.09a 19.75 10.35 1.27 LM(1)             0.18
λmax 95(2) 55.50 49.42 43.97 37.52 31.46 25.54 18.96 12.25 LM(4)             0.62
Trace(1) 341.89 242.56 171.12 106.07 62.45a 31.37 11.62 1.27
Trace 95(3) 182.45 146.75 114.96 86.96 62.61 42.20 25.47 12.39
Lag length = 4
Identified Long-Run Relationships for r=4. Null: Restrictions are accepted: χ2 (1)  = 0.02, p-value = 0.89
Normalized lMs lp ly lE i* lp* lg defgdp debtgdp fdgdp trend
lp
(St. Error)
0.05
(0.17)
- -0.88
(0.35)
1.19
(0.15)
-0.42
(0.11)
0.17
(0.32)
1.38
(0.28)
6.70
(0.94)
-0.66
(0.10)
-0.25
(2.43) Restrict
ed = 0
lMs
(St. Error)
-
Restrict
ed = 1
7.35
(0.64)
4.57
(0.28)
-0.62
(0.26)
6.80
(0.72)
-2.63
(0.39)
-4.24
(2.30)
2.62
(0.20)
0.28
(3.52)
-0.28
(0.02)
lp
(St. Error) Restrict
ed = 0
- 0.37
(0.06)
1.40
(0.002)
-0.34
(0.06)
2.21
(0.15)
-0.02
(0.002) Restrict
ed = 0
Restricted
= 0 Restrict
ed = 0
-0.04
(0.002)
lE
(St. Error) Restrict
ed = 0
0.71
(0.01)
-0.26
(0.04)
- 0.24
(0.05)
-1.58
(0.11) Restrict
ed = 0
Restrict
ed = 0
Restricted
= 0
-0.06
(0.01)
0.03
(0.002)
a =means accept the null of r=4.
(1) Both λmax and Trace tests have been multiplied by the small sample correction factor (N – kp)/N, see
Cheung and Lai (1993). 
(2) The source is Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 2, p. 469.
(3) The source is Johansen (1995a), Table 15.4, p. 216.
* The sample period is 1970Q1-2002Q4. See footnote to Table 1 for the mnemonics and other information.
** LM(1) and LM(4) are one and four-order Lagrangian Multiplier test for autocorrelation, respectively
[Godfrey (1988)].
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Table 3* Long-Run Test Results for Turkey
Tests of the Cointegration Rank
H0= r 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Diagnostic tests**
p-value
λmax(1) 93.44 71.01 54.72 45.05 35.30a 19.22 13.19 8.69 4.18 LM(1)              0.02
λmax 95(2) 61.29 55.50 49.42 43.97 37.52 31.46 25.54 18.96 12.25 LM(4)              0.07
Trace(1) 344.82 251.38 180.36 125.64 80.59a 45.28 26.06 12.87 4.18
Trace 95(3) 221.56 182.45 146.75 114.96 86.96 62.61 42.20 25.47 12.39
Lag length = 5
Identified Long-Run Relationships for r=4. Null: Restrictions are accepted: χ2 (1) = 0.00, p-value = 1.00
Normalized lMs lp i ly lE i* lp* lg defgdp debtgdp fdgdp trend
lp
(St. Error)
0.81
(0.06)
- 0.16
(0.06)
-0.37
(0.10)
0.31
(0.06)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.37
(0.12)
0.07
(0.04)
3.45
(0.46)
-0.85
(0.15)
-0.77
(1.86) Restrict
ed = 0
lMs
(St. Error)
-
Restrict
ed = 1
-1.47
(0.12)
0.07
(0.26)
-0.22
(0.09)
0.56
(0.08)
-1.00
(0.37)
-1.33
(0.09)
-0.40
(0.99)
-2.35
(0.31)
-0.10
(3.62)
0.08
(0.01)
lp
(St. Error)
0.63
(0.03)
- 0.32
(0.04)
-0.51
(0.07)
0.57
(0.03)
-0.21
(0.02)
0.80
(0.08)
0.43
(0.03)
Restricted
= 0
Restricted
= 0 Restrict
ed = 0
-0.03
(0.01)
lE
(St. Error) Restrict
ed = 0
0.44
(0.08)
0.20
(0.10)
1.75
(0.27)
- 0.47
(0.09)
-3.85
(0.32) Restrict
ed = 0
12.13
(1.08)
Restricted
= 0
17.72
(4.57)
0.07
(0.01)
a =means accept the null of r=4.
(1) Both λmax and Trace tests have been multiplied by the small sample correction factor (N – kp)/N, see
Cheung and Lai (1993). 
(2) The source is Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 2, p. 469.
(3) The source is Johansen (1995a), Table 15.4, p. 216.
* The sample period is 1970Q1-2003Q3. See footnote to Table 1 for the mnemonics and other information.
** LM(1) and LM(4) are one and four-order Lagrangian Multiplier test for autocorrelation, respectively
[Godfrey (1988)].
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Table 41: Error Correction Model for Egypt
Dependent Variable = ∆lp
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
p-value for Hansen’s
(1992) stability Li test
∆lMst-1 0.15 0.06 0.18
∆it-4 -0.14 0.05 0.19
∆lyt-1 0.46 0.07 1.00
∆lEt-4 0.05 0.02 1.00
∆lp*t-1 0.14 0.07 0.15
(∆lg) (flex)t-1 -0.53 0.14 0.07
∆defgdpt-1 -0.50 0.17 1.00
∆defgdpt-3 0.79 0.17 1.00
∆defgdpt-4 -0.44 0.19 1.00
∆debtgdpt-3 0.15 0.05 1.00
∆debtgdpt-4 -0.21 0.06 1.00
(∆fdgdp) (peace)t-2 -4.95 1.46 1.00
(ECP)3t-1 -0.0004 0.00004 1.00
flex -0.02 0.01 1.00
psub 0.04 0.01 1.00
price 0.07 0.02 0.10
Hansen’s (1992) stability Li test on the variance = 0.45 p-value = 0.06
Joint (coefficients and the error variance)
Hansen’s (1992) stability Lc test = 3.15 p-value = 1.00
1 The sample period is 1975Q1-1999Q3. Mean of dependent variable=0.03. ∆ means the first difference, ∆lp is the change
in the log of CPI, ∆lp* is the change in the log of an index of industrial countries exports unit values, ∆lMs is the change in
the log of nominal money supply, ∆i is the change in the log[R/(1+R)], where R is the nominal interest rate in decimal
points. ∆lE is the change in the log of the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per $US), and ∆ly is the change in the
log of real GDP. ∆lg is the change in real government expenditures, ∆defgdp, ∆debtgdp and ∆fdgdp are the change in
deficits, outstanding debt and foreign financed debt per GDP, respectively. ECP is the error-correction term generated from
the first identified long-run relationship in the cointegration space, normalized on the log of domestic price (see Table 1).
None of the other error correction terms were statistically significant. Dummy variable peace is equal to 1 since 1979Q2
when Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel and to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable flex is equal to 1 since 1991Q1 and
to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable price is equal to 1 in 1991Q2 and is zero otherwise. psub is equal to 1 from 1994Q4 to
1995Q1. The estimation method is Ordinary Least Squared. R 2=0.53, σ=0.02, DW=2.18, Godfrey(5)=0.31 (significance
level=0.92), White=87.69 (significance level=0.99), ARCH(5)=1.04 (significance level=0.96), RESET=0.24 (significance
level=0.87) and Normality, χ2=1.28 (significance level=0.53). Note that R 2, σ and DW, respectively, denote the adjusted
squared multiple correlation coefficient, the residual standard deviation and the Durbin-Watson statistic. White is White’s
(1980) general test for heteroskedasticity, ARCH is five-order Engle’s (1982) test, Godfrey is five-order Godfrey’s (1978)
test, REST is Ramsey’s (1969) misspecification test, Normality is Jarque and Bera’s (1987) normality statistic, Li is
Hansen’s (1992) stability test for the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient or variance of the error term is constant
and Lc is Hansen’s (1992) stability test for the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients as well as the error variance
are jointly constant.
54
Table 51: Error Correction Model for Iran
Dependent Variable = ∆lp
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
p-value for Hansen’s
(1992) stability Li test
∆lyt-1 0.28 0.05 1.00
∆i*t-1 0.06 0.02 1.00
(∆lp)(rev)t-1 0.38 0.07 1.00
(∆lp)(rev)t-3 0.36 0.06 1.00
(∆lg) (oil)t-4 0.36 0.10 1.00
∆defgdpt-1 -0.97 0.24 1.00
(∆defgdp) (san)t-4 -2.12 0.36 1.00
∆fdgdpt-1 5.52 1.22 1.00
∆fdgdpt-2 -3.00 0.86 1.00
(∆fdgdp) (san)t-2 63.66 17.11 1.00
ECPt-1 -0.003 0.0005 1.00
oil 0.08 0.03 1.00
Q3 -0.05 0.01 1.00
Q4 -0.03 0.01 1.00
Nor 1973Q1 0.09 0.03
Nor 1977Q2 0.11 0.02
Nor 1978Q4 0.06 0.02
To avoid nonsingular matrix
the dependent variable was
adjusted for these dummy
variables
Hansen’s (1992) stability Li test on the variance = 0.26 p-value = 0.18
Joint (coefficients and the error variance)
Hansen’s (1992) stability Lc test = 2.57 p-value = 1.00
1 The sample period is 1970Q1-2002Q4. Mean of dependent variable=0.04. ∆ means the first difference, ∆ly is the change
of the log of real GDP, ∆i* is the change in log[R*/(1+R*)], ∆lp is the change in the log of CPI and ∆lE is the change in
the log of market exchange rate (rials per $US). ∆lg is the change in real government expenditures. ∆defgdp, and ∆fdgdp
are the change in the log of deficits and foreign financed debt per GDP, respectively. ECP is the error correction term
generated from the long-run price determination (see the first identified equation in Table 2). None of the other error
correction terms were statistically significant. Dummy variable rev is equal to 1 since 1979Q2 and to zero, otherwise.
Dummy variable oil is equal to 1 for the period 1973Q4-1974Q1, and to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable san is equal to 1
since 1980Q2 and to zero, otherwise. Q3 and Q4 are equal to 1, in the third and fourth quarters of the year, respectively,
and to zero, otherwise. Nor 1973Q1, Nor 1977Q2 and Nor 1978Q4 are equal to 1 in the quarters indicated to eliminate the
outliers in the data. The estimation method is Ordinary Least Squared. R 2=0.70, σ=0.02, DW=1.98, Godfrey(5)=0.52
(significance level=0.79), White=99.66 (significance level=1.00), ARCH(5)=7.65 (significance level=0.18), RESET=0.19
(significance level=0.90) and Normality, χ2=4.98 (significance level=0.08). For other information see footnote of Table 4.
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Table 61: Error Correction Model for Turkey
Dependent Variable = ∆lp
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
p-value for Hansen’s
(1992) stability Li test
∆lpt-1 0.65 0.09 1.00
(∆lp) (vtax)t-1 -0.27 0.09 1.00
(∆lMs) (vtax)t-1 0.15 0.03 1.00
(∆lMs) (vtax)t-2 0.13 0.03 1.00
∆it-3 -0.07 0.04 1.00
∆it-4 0.08 0.04 1.00
∆lyt-1 0.12 0.05 1.00
∆lyt-2 -0.11 0.06 0.17
(∆ly) (mex)t-2 0.22 0.09 1.00
(∆ly) (flex)t-4 0.82 0.26 1.00
∆lEt-2 -0.13 0.036 1.00
∆lp*t-2 -0.26 0.09 0.15
ECPt-1 0.35 0.10 1.00
(ECP)2t-1 0.08 0.03 1.00
ECdt-1 -0.07 0.02 1.00
fcrisis 0.22 0.03 0.15
Q4 0.03 0.01 0.08
Nor 1980Q1 0.18 0.03 0.01
Hansen’s (1992) stability Li test on the variance = 0.23 1.00 (p-value)
Joint (coefficients and the error variance)
Hansen’s (1992) stability Lc test = 3.67 0.20 (p-value)
1 The sample period is 1970Q1-2003Q3. Mean of dependent variable=0.10. ∆ means the first difference, ∆lp is the change
in the log of CPI, ∆lMs is the change in the log of nominal money supply, ∆i is the change in the log[R/(1+R)], where R is
the nominal interest rate in decimal points , ∆ly is the change in the log of real GDP, ∆lE is the change in the log of market
exchange rate (liras per $US) and ∆lp* is the change in the log of index of industrial countries exports unit values. ECP is
the error-correction term generated from the first identified long-run relationship in the cointegration space, normalized on
the log of CPI (see Table 3). ECd is the error-correction term generated from the third identified long-run relationship in
the cointegration space, normalized on the log of real demand for money. The other error correction term was not
statistically significant. Dummy variable vtax is equal to 1 since 1984Q4 and to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable mex is
equal to 1 for the period of 1994Q4-1999Q4 and to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable flex is equal to 1 since 2001Q1 and to
zero, otherwise. fcrisis is equal to 1 for 1994Q2 and to zero, otherwise. Q4 is a dummy variable equal to 1, in the fourth
quarter of the year, and to zero, otherwise. Nor 1980Q1 is equal to 1 in the first quarter of 1980 to eliminate the outliers in
the data. The estimation method is the Ordinary Least Squared. R 2=0.74, σ=0.03, DW=1.92, Godfrey(5)=0.31
(significance level=0.93), White=129.99 (significance level=0.99), ARCH(5)=4.72 (significance level=0.45), RESET=0.36
(significance level=0.78) and Normality, χ2 =1.62 (significance level=0.45). For other information see footnote of Table 4.
